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A UNIFIED CORPS OF FEDERAL 







Introduction of bills to establish a nationwide Corps of Federal 
Administrative Law Judges· has rekindled debate over the efficacy 
of, and need for, the sweepiilg changes which apparently will attend 
enactment. The bills are endorsed by the Federal Administrative 
Law Judges Conference (FAUC), a professional association which 
represents, and admits to membership, all federally-employed ad­
miilistrative law judges.2 
Many of the affected judges believe that no cogent reasons have 
been advanced that demonstrate a need to establish such a COrpS.3 
Principally, the bills are designed to iilsure administrative law 
judges' decisional iildependence.4 It is asserted, however, that the 
existiilg statutes and judicial perception of federal administrative law 
• Administrative Law Judge, National Labor Relations Board. A.B., Syracuse 
University, 1951; J.D., Syracuse University College of Law, 1954. 
The opinions of the author are his own. They do not necessarily represent the views 
of members of the National Labor Relations Board or any member of the Board's staff. 
This anicle has not been reveiwed or approved by the National Labor Relations Board. 
1. See S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3539, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); 
see also 129 CONGo REC. S6609-IO (daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin). 
2. 129 CONGo REc. S66l0 (daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin). 
3. Approximately 820 of the total federal complement of approximately 1150 ad­
ministrative law judges are employed by the Social Security Administration (SSA). Id 
The results of a survey conducted among the Federal Administrative Law Judges Con­
ference membership have been cited as a claim that the corps bills are favored by a large 
majority of present incumbent judges. The poll's results are deceptive. 357 judges re­
sponded to the survey. Seventy-six voted against supponing the legislation. While 281 
judges voted to suppon it, 205 of such votes were cast by SSA judges. It is clear the 
disputes, discussed infra text accompanying note 69, between these judges and their 
agency distoned the survey's results. Disregarding the votes cast by SSA judges would 
result in seventy-six judges in suppon of and seventy judges against the corps. See Ad­
ministratille Law Judge Corps Act: Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Suhcomm. on Adminis­
tratille Practice and Procedure ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
175, 189-90 (1983) (statement of Joseph B. Kennedy, Chairman, Ad Hoc Comm. of Ad­
ministrative Law Judges) [hereinafter cited as HelUings on S. 1275). 
4. 129 CONGo REc. S6609-10 (daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin). 
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judges comprise satisfactory and sufficient guarantees of such 
independence. 
This article will (1) summarize the proposed legislation; (2) de­
velop the current status of administrative law judges; and (3) analyze 
the reasons prof erred in support of the corps and demonstrate their 
inadequacy. 
II. BACKGROUND--THE CORPS BILLS 
In his floor remarks introducing Senate bill 1275,S Senator 
Howell Heflin observed "Administrative law judges are a significant 
part of our Federal adjudicatory system." Administrative disputes 
should be adjudicated in an independent atmosphere free of bias, in 
order to insure fairness and give credence to administrative deci­
sions. Structural reform of the administrative law judge system is 
necessary to insure truly independent adjudications.6 The Senator 
also stated that his proposal would probably effect cost savings, 
achieve efficiencies and improve public perception of administrative 
law judges.' 
The pending bill creates an "Administrative Law Judge Corps 
of the United States."8 Initially, the Corps would consist of all cur­
rent federal administrative law judges who would preside over all 
Administrative Procedure Act hearings.9 They could also accept any 
other case referred to the Corps by any federal agency or court desir­
ing to make a decision based upon a record developed at a hearing 
conducted by an administrative law judge. 10 
The Corps would be headed by a chief judge appointed by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. I I There would 
be seven operating divisions, identified by subject area, 12 presumably 
to preserve the expertise of the present judges, and each division 
would be headed by a presidentially-appointed division chief 
5. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). This bill is reprinted at 129 CONGo REc. 
S66\O·\3 (dailyed. May 12, 1983). An identical bill, H.R. 3539, 98th Cong., 1st Scss. 
(1983), is currently pending in the House of Representatives. 
6. 129 CONGo REC' S6609·10 (daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin). 
7. It!. 
8. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Scss. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c. 
§ 562(a». 
9. It!. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 562(b». These powers are specified in 
5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(3) (1982). 
10. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Scss. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 568(a)(3». 
11. It!. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 563(a». 
12. It!. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 564(b)(1)-(7». 
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judge.13 The bill establishes a five-member judicial nominating 
commission to submit names of qualified candidates for the posi­
tions of chief and division chief judges. 14 The number of divisions 
could be increased by the council, which would consist of the Corps' 
chief judge and the division chief judges, to a maximum of ten and 
decreased to not less than four divisions. IS Additionally, the Council 
would have authority over appointment, assignment, transfers and 
reassignment of judges to the various divisions; and to prescribe 
rules of practice and procedure for conduct of proceedings and busi­
ness before the COrpS.16 Finally, the bill contains procedures for re­
moval and discipline of administrative law judges. 17 A Complaints 
Resolution Board, comprised of two judges from each substantive 
division and elected by the judges of each division, would receive 
complaints of misconduct. 18 After investigation, the Board could is­
sue advisory recommendations to the Council which, in tum, could 
file charges against judges with the Merit Systems Protection Board 
(MSPB).19 The MSPB, after an opportunity for a hearing on the 
record, could remove and discipline judges for misconduct, incom­
petence, neglect of duty, or for physical or mental disability.20 
There have been earlier efforts to separate administrative law 
judges from the government agencies who currently employ them. 
In 1941, such a proposal was studied and rejected.21 In 1955, the 
Hoover Commission proposed separation.22 In 1973, FADC recom­
mended such separation to the Civil Service Commission.23 The 
LaMacchia Commission report suggested study of the feasibility of a 
corps in 1974;24 and in 1976 a corps concept was advocated by Ber­
nard G. Segal, former president of the American Bar Association.2s 
13. Id (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 564(a». 
14. Id (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 566(a». 

IS. Id (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 564(a». 

16. Id (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 565). 
17. Id (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 569). 
18. Id (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 569(c), (d». 
19. Id (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 569(1). 
20. Id (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 569(a)(I)-(2». 
21. Arr'y GENEJlAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE IN GOV'T AGENCIES, S. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1941). 
22. HOOVER COMM'N ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, LEGAL 
SERVICES AND PROCEDURES 87-88 (1955). 
23. UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE 
STUDY OF THE UnLlZAnON OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (LAMACCHIA COMM'N 
REPORT) app. (1974). 
24. Id at 47, 51. 
25. Segal, Th~ AdministroJiv~ Law Judg~: Thirl)' Y~ars ofProgr~ss ami th~ Road 
Ahead, 62 A.B.A.J. 1424, 1425 (1976). 
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In 1981, Jeffrey S. Lubbers, now Research Director of the Adminis­
trative Conference of the United States, proposed an experimental 
pilot program for a corps into which judges of seventeen specified 
federal agencies would be transferred.26 
III. ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL 1275 
One of the arguments advanced in favor of the Corps is that the 
legislation will serve to correct misconceptions of administrative law 
judges. An examination of legislative, judicial and public perception 
of administrative law judges is instructive.27 
A. 	 The Real and Perceived Independence ofAdministrative Low 
Judges-Functions and Responsibilities 
The principal focus of the cited studies and recommendations is 
decisional independence. Impliedly, at least, an independent corps 
of administrative law judges is a panacea. Undoubtedly administra­
tive law judges' independence is necessary and public perception of 
administrative justice needs enhancement. 28 The bill as drafted, 
however, will not provide the correct vehicle to achieve those 
purposes. 
Federal administrative law judges deal with matters that have 
an impact on virtually every phase of the national economy and our 
daily lives. They preside over cases involving bank mergers; labor­
management relations; nuclear, oil, electric and gas energy alloca­
tion and rates; consumer products; social security benefits claims; 
worker's compensation; health and safety in mining and industry; 
interstate trade; securities regulation; international trade; communi­
cations; food and drugs; and a host of other matters.29 
The administrative law judges serve as trial judges.30 They 
presently are assigned to a myriad of federal independent and execu­
tive branch agencies which enforce or regulate federal laws. When 
they preside at hearings, these judges have authority to: (I) adminis­
26. Lubbers, A Unified Corps 0/ALJs: A Proposal 10 Tes/lhe Idea allhe Federal 
Level, 6S JUDICATURE 266, 275-76 (1981). 
27. See 129 CONGo REc. S6610 (daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hedin). 
28. Address by Senator Howell Hedin to American Bar Association, Institute of 
Judicial Administration (July 30, 1983). 
29. Id 
30. S U.S.c. § SS6(b)(3) (1982). There is a functional difference, however, between 
the SSA judges and the remainder of the federal administrative law judge complement. 
Hearings conducted by the former essentially are non-adversarial and not required to 
conform to the Administrative Procedure Act. The latter group conduct adversarial 
hearings. 
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ter oaths and affirmations; (2) issue subpoenas; (3) rule upon offers of 
proof and receive relevant evidence; (4) take or cause the taking of 
depositions; (5) hold pre-hearing conferences for settlement or sim­
plification of issues; (6) regulate the course of the hearing; (7) dispose 
of procedural requests; (8) question witnesses; (9) consider the facts 
in the record and the arguments and contentions made, or questions 
involved; (10) determine credibility and make findings of facts and 
conclusions oflaw; and (11) take any actions authorized by agency 
rule consistent with provisions of the United States Code, Title 5.31 
1. Judicial Perception 
Administrative law judges are vested with no less responsibility 
for maintaining the integrity of our judicial system than the judges 
commissioned pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitu­
tion. The Supreme Court, in 1978, recognized in Bu/Z v. Econo­
mou,32 that administrative law judges are "functionally comparable" 
to judges employed in the judicial branch and conferred on them 
absolute immunity for judicial acts.33 In doing so, the Court ob­
served: ''There can be little doubt that the role of the . . . adminis­
trative law judge is 'functionally comparable' to that of a 
[constitutional] judge. His powers are often, if not generally, compa­
rable to those of a trial judge ...."34 
In 1980, the Supreme Court, in Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. ,35 again 
commented upon the role of these judges. The Court observed that 
the independent administrative law judge is one ''whose impartiality 
serves as the ultimate guarantee of a fair and meaningful proceeding 
in our constitutional regime."36 
More recently, United States Court of Appeals Judge Aldisert, 
in a concurring opinion in NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp. ,37 took 
the time to enunciate the rationale for viewing administrative law 
judges as unique and highly-respectable decision-makers. Judge Al­
disert wrote: 
Accepting for purposes of argument that to be impartial 
judges must be independent of all political or employment pres­
sures, I submit that the view that the [administrative law judges] 
31. Id 
32. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
33. Id at 512·13. 
34. Id at 513. 
35. 446 U.S. 238 (1980). 
36. Id at 250. 
37. 657 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981). 
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are not sufficiently independent or competent is now so shopworn 
as to be totally obsolete. To the contrary, [administrative law 
judges], though not yet annointed with life tenure, enjoy an inde­
pendence that in my view is plainly sufficient to satisfy reasonable 
doubts. 
For example, although [administrative law judges] are con­
sidered agency personnel, they are selected by the Office of Per­
sonnel Management (OPM) independently of any agency 
recommendation or rating, 5 U.S.C. § 5362, and cannot be re­
moved from office without a hearing establishing good cause 
before the Merit Systems Protection Board, 5 U.S.C. § 7521. 
Their pay is controlled by the Civil Service Commission. [Admin­
istrative law judges] can be disqualified from a case only upon 
petition by either the agency or a private party. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b). 
Similarly, cases are assigned on a rotating basis so that the agency 
cannot "fix" the result by choice of judge. 5 U.S.C. § 3105. They 
are not subject to the whim of the agency .. [Administrative law 
judges] are strictly independent of investigative or prosecutorial 
personnel in the agency. 5 U.S.c. § 554(d). 
Moreover, the selection process for [administrative law 
judges] should inspire more respect for this office than is generally 
extended by Article III judges; it is a process that requires rigorous 
inquiries into the background and competence of the candidates. 
Applicants must supply twenty professional references. A mini­
mum seven years of litigation experience is required to meet the 
threshhold selection requirement. A test opinion must be drafted 
and evaluated on the basis of many factors including clarity and 
conciseness. . . . Finally. after the various scores have been com­
bined. applicants considered tentatively eligible are interviewed 
by a special panel usually composed of an OPM official, an attor­
ney qualified in the field of administrative law, and an agencyoffi­
cial. This committee submits a recommendation to the director of 
OPM who makes final eligibility determinations among qualified 
candidates. Once appointed to an agency, an [administrative law 
judge] is not subjected to the usual probationary employment pe­
riod for agency employees, further insuring [administrative law 
judge] independence. 5 U.S.C. § 3321. ... 
The rigors of the selection procedure and the statutory pro­
tections of [administrative law judge] independence suggest to me 
that the federal judiciary need not look down its collective nose at 
[administrative law judge] decisions.38 
38. Id. at 527-28. 
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2. Congressional Perception 
Congress has recognized the need of administrative law judges 
to possess decisional independence. Relevant legislative history 
demonstrates Congress's concern for preservation of those judges' 
independence from influences, especially agency influences, that 
might in any way reduce that independence.39 That concept was em­
bodied as a major reform within the federal Administrative Proce­
dure Act (AP A).40 Congress took as its mission the assurance of 
fairness in the full range of administrative action affecting the public. 
It was especially concerned with the trial-type hearing which came to 
be governed by sections 5 through 8 of the APA.41 It recognized a 
need to allay public "suspicions . . . that the submittals of private 
parties are not fully considered, that the views of agency personnel 
are emphasized without opportunity for private parties to meet them, 
and that matters outside the record are often the real grounds for 
decision."42 
Prior to the APA's enactment, Congress had before it a system 
in which administrative trials were held before agency employe,es, 
subject to agency control respecting classification pay, promotion 
and tenure; individuals in a "dependent status."43 ''There were no 
reliable safeguards to ensure the objectivity and judicial capability of 
presiding officers. . . . [T]he power of the agencies to control and 
influence such personnel made questionable the contention of any 
agency that its proceedings assured fundamental fairness."44 There 
was no statutory professional corps of administrative law judges. 
Agencies could assign employees to preside over a trial one day, and 
administer a program the next. 
Congress addressed these concerns in enacting section 11 of the 
APA.4S It vested the judges46 with the duty to exclusively preside at 
39. See AlT'y GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINIS­
TRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOV'T AGENCIES, S. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 272 
(1941). 
40. 5 U.S.C. II 551-559,701-706, 1305,3105,3344,6362, 7562 (1982). 
41. ATT'y GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE IN GOV'T AGENCIES, S. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 272 (1941). 
42. Id. quoted in Mac:y, TIre APA IlIId the Hearing Examiner: Products ofQ Viable 
Political Sockty, 27 FED. 8J. 351, 354 n.7 (1967). 
43. Ramspcck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 130 (1953). 
44. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judici­
1lT)', 33 AD. L. REv. 109, III (1981). 
45. Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 11,60 Stat. 237, 244 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.c. 
§ 7521 (1982»; see Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1980). 
46. The hearing examiner title was changed administratively to"Administrative 
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trial-type hearings; and made their compensation outside of agency 
control. Administrative law judges became subject to removal only 
for good cause, after a hearing on the record, subject to judicial re­
vieW'l7-a procedural right unique to federal civil servants serving 
under Article I of the Constitution.48 All other federal employees 
are removable prior to hearing and must pursue their hearing and 
review rights after their employment ceases.49 
Section 11 drew upon ''the more ancient wisdom grounded in 
history and contained in Article III, which safeguards federal judi­
cial independence through still more stringent compensation and 
tenure provisions."5o Just as the independent judiciary was "struc­
turally insulated from the other branches to provide a safe haven for 
individual liberties in times of crisis,"5l so Congress intended admin­
istrative law judges to act as a bulwark for administrative litigants, 
as "a critical check on potentially excessive or unauthorized regula­
tion."s2 Within their sphere, the judges were given a role "function­
ally comparable" to that of a federal trial judge.53 These provisions 
were the very heart and sole of the new act. 54 
The APA's guarantee of independence not only recognized the 
unique status of administrative law judges within the executive 
branch, but also invested their decisions with authority earlier with­
held by reviewing courts, who had considered the judges as "not suf­
ficiently independent or competent" to deserve deference. 55 
By 1953, the Supreme Court had noted the new guarantees of 
administrative law judges' independence: Congress intended to pro­
vide tenure for hearing examiners within Civil Service concepts. S6 
They were not to be paid, promoted, or discharged at the whim or 
Law Judge" in 1971, see 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (1982), and was later adopted by Congress. 
Act of March 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251, §§ 2,3,92 Stat. 183, 183-84. 
47. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, § II, 60 Stat. 237, 244 (1946) 
(current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559,701-706, 1305,3105,3344,6362,7562). 
48. Id 
49. See 5 U.S.c. § 7513 (1982); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 145-46 (1974). 
50. Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1980); see Bu/Z, 438 U.S. at 514; 
Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1953). 
51. Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1980). 
52. Hearings 011 H.R. 6768 Before tile House Comm. 011 Post OJlice aNi Civil Sen­
ice, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1980) (statement of Christopher McNaughton). 
53. Bu/Z, 438 U.S. at 513. 
54. See Bu/Z, 438 U.S. at 514; Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 51-53 
(1950); see also Zwerdling, RejlectiollS 011 tile Role ojQII Administrative Low Judge, 25 AD. 
L. REv. 9, 13 (1973). 
55. PermQllellt Label Corp., 657 F.2d at 527. 
56. Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 142 (1953). 
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caprice of the agency or for political reasons. 57 
In addition to these provisions, the APA prohibits administra­
tive law judges from engaging in exparle communications regarding 
facts in issue unless all parties are notified and given an opportunity 
to participate in those discussions; prevents supervision by someone 
who performs investigative or prosecutorial functions in their agen­
cies; and proscribes review of administrative law judges' decisions by 
agency personnel who performed investigative or prosecutorial ac­
tivities in the particular case under review. 58 
Congress, in some areas, has provided even greater assurances 
of administrative law judges' independence. For example, the Fed­
eral Mine Safety and Health Review Commission and the Occupa­
tional Safety and Health Review Commission contain separate corps 
ofjudges whose decisions are final, subject only to discretionary ap­
pellate review by those Commissions.59 The review standard im­
posed on the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission 
is the same as that which Article III courts apply to the Commission 
itself.60 Additionally, the National Labor Relations Act expressly 
provides for strict separation of the NLRB General Counsel and his 
staff from the five-member Board, its staff and the administrative law 
judges assigned to that agency.61 
3. Public Perception 
This element is the most difficult to evaluate. Its components 
are varied and derive from a variety of factors. Judicial and legisla­
tive pronouncements affect the public view of administrative law 
judges, and media reports of these judge-conducted hearings also 
have an impact. 
The most accurate reftection of public perception should ema­
nate from personal confrontations between individual citizens and 
administrative law judges. Because the confrontations are few, the 
manner in which the public perceives administrative law judges is 
principally dependent upon the reports of the administrative judici­
ary received from legal practitioners and other on-the-scene observ­
ers. The available evidence, admittedly sparse, tends to demonstrate 
57. Id. 
58. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1982). 
59. 30 U.S.C.A. § 823 (West Supp. 1983); 29 U.S.C.A. § 661(i) (West Supp. 1983). 
60. Donovan ex Tel Chacon v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 709 F.2d 86, 90-92 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) (findings by the Commission's administrative law judges are final and conclusive). 
61. 29 U.S.C.A. § 153 (West 1973 & Supp. 1983). 
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that administrative law judges generally enjoy a positive position in 
the administrative process. 
There are references to administrative law judges as the "hidden 
judiciary."62 Ostensibly, that characterization connotes a negative 
aura. It is equally susceptible, however, to the opposite conclusion. 
It readily imparts a feeling that these judges are performing their 
functions at acceptable levels. The absence of a public display of 
dissatisfaction, except regarding the Social Security Administra­
tion,63 with the performance of the administrative process is rather 
compelling evidence that administrative law judges presently dis­
pense judicious, fair, objective and competent administrative justice. 
It does not matter that individual members of the public are una­
ware of the distinction between administrative law, or other, judges. 
To them, anyone invested with the title "judge" has certain plenary 
authority. The fine distinctions between judges are irrelevant. 
Two examples of public perception are noteworthy. Both exam­
ples were presented to the Senate subcommittee which conducted 
hearings on Senate bill 1275 on September 20, 1983. When present­
ing the views of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP), Althea T. L. Simmons, NAACP Wash­
ington D.C. Bureau Director commented: "In our opinion, the idea 
that the independence of Administrative Law Judges is compro­
mised by their relationship with a particular agency, past or present, 
is without merit."64 In a similar vein, Judge Joseph B. Kennedy of 
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, testified: 
at a recent meeting of the Committee on Practice and Procedure 
before the National Labor-Relations Board of the Section of La­
bor and Employment Law of the American Bar Association, a 
group composed of both management and union labor law practi­
tioners. Those present virtually unanimously expressed their op­
position to establishment of a corps of administrative law judges. 
If there were any real indications that administrative law judges 
are not independent of the agencies whose cases they hear, the 
attorneys who practice before the agencies would have been the 
first to seek changes in the present system.65 
62. U.S. News & World Report, Nov. I, 1982, at 56; Rich, emtro! Panels ofAdmin­
istrative La.., Judges: An Introduction, 65 JUDICATURE 233, 233 (1981); Lubbers, supra 
note 44, at 109. 
63. See infra text accompanying note 69. 
64. Hearings on S. 127.5, supra note 3, at 163 (statement of Althea T. L. Simmons, 
Director, Wash. Bureau, NAACP). 
65. Id. at 179 (statement of Hon. Joseph B. Kennedy). 
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I echo these remarks. Those who argue that public perception needs 
improvement are guided by a base of an inherently fallacious as­
sumption that the existing system engenders its broad disdain. There 
simply is no evidence that this assumption is correct. The informa­
tion available relative to the approximately nineteen federal admin­
istrative agencies, other than the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) does not support such an assumption. 
4. Summary 
The courts accord administrative law judges and their decisions, 
deference and respect.66 Congress has consistently pursued a course 
which is designed to afford maximum assurance of decisional inde­
pendence and special status to administrative law judges.67 They 
have been well-insulated from agency influence by statute.68 The 
public appears satisfied with their performance. There simply has 
been no substantive argument or data presented that requires legisla­
tive action to improve perceptions of the administrative judiciary. 
B. Decisional Independence 
In the backdrop of legislative and judicial protection provided, 
the argument that the bill provides greater decisional independence 
to administrative law judges wanes. There are no new indicia of au­
tonomy contained in those bills. 
The independence which is substantive and critical is the exist­
ence of freedom to find facts and render a decision based upon a 
judge's personal assessment of the facts and law without fear of re­
taliation or discrimination based on the resulting conclusions and 
decisions. 
The issue of decisional independence was resolved by enact­
ment of the APA. Other existing statutes, and civil service regula­
tions effectively form the tools by which to recognize that 
independence and the special status of administrative law judges. 
What is needed is strict implementation of those mandates; not a 
change in them. 
Only one example of possible improper agency interference has 
been cited. That is, the nascent situation in SSA. In that agency, the 
judges have complained that they are being SUbjected to improper 
pressures to deny disability benefits by the imposition of production 
66. See suprQ text accompanying notes 32-38. 
67. See suprQ notes 39-54 and accompanying text. 
68. See suprQ notes 55-61 and accompanying text. 
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quotas, and by the conduct of unauthorized performance appraisals 
which result in unfounded disciplinary action against them.69 
The concerns of the SSA judges are clearly legitimate. Their 
allegations, alone, clearly tend to undermine public confidence in the 
administrative judiciary. If true, those allegations seriously detract 
from the critical elements of decisional independence which Con­
gress has taken decades to develop. 
However, problems of SSA judges apparently are unique to 
them. During the Senate hearings on Senate bill 1275 on June 23 
and September 20, 1983,70 several witnesses appeared and testified. 
No evidence was presented to show judicial, legislative or public 
concern that the present administrative process is unfair, except 
within SSA. If the SSA judges' complaints are justifiable, they arise 
from their functional differences from other judges, and also SSA's 
failure to apply the existing administrative law judges protections to 
its judges; and not from the absence of statutes which prescribe inde­
pendence. If the AP A, and other relevant statutes and regulations, 
are being ignored in agencies other than SSA, it was incumbent 
upon the proponents of the Corps to produce such evidence. The 
failure to do so, belies the claim that there is a generalized lack of 
decisional independence. 
Solution of any problems which may exist within SSA does not 
depend upon enactment of Senate bill 1275. Two bills, Senate bill 
191171 and House resolution 3541,72 are pending which directly ad­
dress those problems. Senate bill 1911 is entitled a bill "to ensure 
the independence of certain administrative law judges."73 The bill 
proposes to establish a separate new Health and Human Services 
Review Commission, patterned after the legislation which governs 
the Occupational Health and Safety and Federal Mine Safety Re­
view Commissions.74 The bill proposes transfer of all SSA judges to 
the new commission, effectively removing them from their present 
condition by which they are subject to executive and administrative 
supervision.7!! The SSA judges' professional organization has urged 
favorable action on this bill. In the absence of empirical information 
69. See, e.g., Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980). 
70. The author personally attended the hearings. 
71. 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
72. Id. 
73. S. 1911, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
74. Compare id willi 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1976 &; Supp. V 1981) and 30 U.S.C. § 823 
(1976 &; Supp. V 1981). 
75. S. 1191, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
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that administrative law judges' independence is threatened in other 
agencies, it clearly is more efficient and appropriate for Congress to 
concentrate on methods of solving such problems where they exist 
than to interrupt a system, developed by careful deliberation and 
proved successful by experience, where there is no attack upon the 
judges' independence. 
The administrative law judges assigned to the independent com­
missions such as the Federal Mine Safety Review Commission and 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission suffer no patent problems 
of interference with independence. They all apparently function 
well under the existing statutory scheme. Thus, to ameliorate 
whatever problem exists regarding independence of the judges, Con­
gress need only establish the Health and Human Services (HHS) Re­
view Commission. That move, alone, would provide the SSA judges 
with the safeguards of independence presently enjoyed by all other 
federal administrative law judges. In this context, there is no need to 
make structural changes in the administrative judiciary. Establish­
ment of the HHS Review Commission provides the solution to the 
solitary, vexing issue of administrative law judges' independence. It 
would be directly responsive to the arguments that any real threat to 
independence exists, without disrupting the adequate operations of 
administrative law judges pursuant to the AP A. 
IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
Senate bill 1275 raises other issues that require examination. In 
their totality, they show that the bill, in its present form, should not 
be enacted. 
A. Administrative Law Judge Expertise 
Clearly, a goal of the legislation is to have a group of adminis­
trative law judges who are able to conduct hearings of all types. The 
bill, however, also recognizes the importance of maintaining exper­
tise in certain areas of the law. The seven enumerated substantive 
divisions are designed to retain the need for specialization. 76 
The bill's design is flawed. First, preservation of expertise is 
only symbolic. As earlier noted, the Corps' divisions are tempo­
rary.77 Their number is subject to fluctuation at the whim of the 
76. See S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Scss. § 2 (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 564(b)(I)-(7». 
77. Id (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 564(b». 
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council78 and they are subject to change immediately upon enact­
ment.'9 Second, the subject-matter groupings within the divisions is 
contrary to the purported aim of expertise preservation. Some of the 
divisions contain such an amalgam of substantive legal subjects that 
would require judges expert in one area of the division to undertake 
extensive training to become competent in another subject. 80 
For example, the Division of General Programs is designed to 
hear cases currently heard by administrative law judges assigned to 
the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Merit Systems Pro­
tection Board. These areas are plainly unrelated to one another. 
The former involves regulation and control of potentially dangerous 
drugs, while the latter deals with labor relations problems between 
federal employees and their employers. Their substantive underpin­
nings are patently dissimilar. Each area contains wholly separate 
specialized and technical knowledge. 
It is not suggested that most of the present administrative law 
judges are not sufficiently endowed with an ability to conduct com­
plete, fair and impartial hearings and issue decisions in both areas. 
Yet certainly, such transitions will not be easy. A system requiring 
study and re-education is inefficient and contrary to the fundamental 
goal of the administrative law system. Separate agencies were estab­
lished by Congress precisely to assure the development and mainte­
nance of entities imbued with a high level of expertise in specialized 
legal subjects. A merger of certain areas with others diminishes the 
congressional intent and operational features which have withstood 
the tests of time and experience. Needed expertise could be improp­
erly diverted if the Corps' Council, in its wisdom, were to make sub­
stantial changes in the composition of the divisions by contraction. 
NAACP spokeswoman Simmons told the senators at the September, 
1983 hearings that 
[O]ne of the more troubling aspects of [Senate bill] 1275 is the 
destructive impact it would have upon the level of expertise pos­
sessed by [administrative law judges]. . . . Aside from the initial 
assignment of current [administrative law judges] to divisions, 
there is no requirement that [they] be assigned to the division in 
which they possess expertise .... 
Our legal system, both judicial and administrative, is becom­
ing increasingly more complex and without [administrative law 
78. Id 
79. Id 
80. See id 
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judges] experienced in the specific area of the law ... [the public] 
... is apt to suffer .... [W]ithout an experienced [administra­
tive law judge] familiar with the purposes the particular legislation 
was intended to accomplish, the subtle nuances of the law, the 
elements of the various legal doctrines that apply, and what infor­
mation must be elicited to apply those doctrines, those least ahle to 
secure experienced, usually more expensive, representation will 
suffer. One of the prices paid for a 'generalist' judge is the heavy 
burden which falls upon the parties to 'educate' the judge.81 
Malcolm Rich, while employed as a research attorney at the 
American Judicature Society, cogently observed that whether ad­
ministrative law judge specialized expertise is necessary "probably 
depends on the type of case-·a rate-making proceeding may require 
more technical expertise than a case involving eligibility for 
benefits."82 
The tenuous existence of the seven divisions contained in Senate 
bill 1275 reduces the opportunity for fair consideration of the nature 
and type of cases as a factor in utilization of expertise. Assignment 
of hearing priorities and transfer ofjudges among the divisions is left 
to the Council's discretion.83 The most well-intentioned implemen­
tation of that authority could impede enforcement of laws by as­
signing judges out of their areas of expertise to divisions which the 
Council has deemed to require priority action. 
Redistribution and realignment of judges in such circumstances 
could conceivably be detrimental to agencies that must hear and de­
cide cases under a particular statute. If agencies lose control of their 
enforcement obligations, the provisions of Senate bill 1275 which 
purportedly preserve expertise become illusory. 
B. Cost Effectiveness 
It has been urged that a unified corps will result in substantial 
cost savings and efficiencies. That assertion is undocumented. No 
cost analysis apparently has been made or presented. Instead, this 
bare assertion is drawn from recent experience among some states 
which have adopted central panel systems. In particular, the signifi­
81. Hearings on S. 127.5, supra note 3, at 162-63 (statement of Althea T. L. Sim­
mons) (emphasis in original). 
82. Rich, Adapting tlte Central Panel System: A Su"ey ofSeven States, 65 JUDICA­
TURE 246, 253 (1981). 
83. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 565(d». 
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cant cost savings made in Minnesota have been cited.84 
During testimony at the June, 1983 Senate hearings, Duane R. 
Harves, Minnesota Chief Hearing Examiner, conceded "it has been 
somewhat difficult to determine the actual cost savings .. ."8S 
achieved by operation of a central panel system. He stated that sig­
nificant cost savings were realized from centralization of the Minne­
sota hearing officers into an office independent of the agencies it 
services.86 Nonetheless, it is difficult to fully assess how much of the 
savings are directly attributable to centralization. Mr. Harves stated 
that Minnesota realized a ten percent reduction in the office caseload 
since the central panel system was installed.87 That reduction di­
rectly resulted from legislative budget cutting.88 Another thirty-five 
percent reduction in caseload was ascribed to legislation which re­
duced the number of hearings required to be held.89 Mr. Harves 
cited actual cost reductions, in dollar amounts, in certain enumer­
ated state agencies. None exceeded fifty percent.90 Assuming the 
forty-five percent caseload drop results in an equal percentage of 
cost reduction, the total cost decrease is not as substantial as her­
alded by the proponents of Senate bill 1275. Moreover, the cost of 
operating the new centralized office does not appear to have been 
factored into the statistics of the reductions discussed. The addition 
of those sums undoubtedly would further diminish the overall 
amount of reduced costs evolving from the Minnesota consolidation. 
Malcolm Rich observed, regarding costs of central panel sys­
tems, that there is a "striking . . . lack of hard data on budgetary 
issues [and] ... most views on the budgetary issue are not based on 
financial studies; necessary data is often unavailable."91 Those ob­
servations were made in 1981. Today, more specific fiscal data 
surely is available. It is unclear whether any effort has been made to 
search for such information. Mr. Harves' Senate remarks, two years 
after Mr. Rich's observations demonstrate that more recent, though 
not altogether complete, statistics are available. The seemingly in­
sufficient investigation into this area cannot be used in support of the 
legislation. Those who advocate enactment of Senate bill 1275 bear 
84. Hearings on S. 127.5, supra note 3, at 84-90 (statement of Hon. Duane R. 
Harves, Minnesota Chief Administrative Law Judge). 
85. Id at 85. 
86. Id at 87. 
87. Id at 88. 
88. Id 
89. Id 
90. Id at 87. 
91. Rich, supra note 82, at 250. 
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the burden of producing evidence to support their contentions, or 
explain why it is not feasible. 
In the face of an attempt to effect the widespread reorganization 
contemplated by Senate bill 1275, in the posture of an existing fed­
eral system virtually free of major criticism (except in SSA), reftec­
tive study and analysis should precede action on the Corps' bill. To 
date, a paucity of probative financial evidence has been produced.92 
Surely, the diverse and important interests at stake in federal admin­
istrative proceedings deserve more deliberate study to enable the 
making of the most accurate conclusion whether or not a unified fed­
eral administrative law judge corps actually will achieve cost reduc­
tions. This issue should not be resolved by mere rhetoric of 
interested participants. 
C. Improved Efficiency 
Another argument submitted to support Senate bill 1275 is that 
it will foster more efficient operation of the administrative process 
and increase ftexibility in assignment ofjudges to cases. It is asserted 
that a corps will enable "better correlation to the various peaks and 
valleys of individual agency caseloads and would eliminate agency 
overstaffing to meet surges of adjudicative activities in order to avoid 
backlogs and constituent complaints."93 As with the cost-savings is­
sue, no documentation was submitted to support this position. 
There is some evidence to show that efficiency of operations has 
not been a motivational element in establishing judges' corps in state 
jurisdictions. It is only an unsupported assumption that an employ­
ment relationship between the judges and their agencies will com­
promise either decisional independence or the alleged salutary 
effects of organizational separation. Only four state central panels 
(California, Colorado, Massachusetts and Tennessee) vest assign­
ment discretion in the panel director.94 In other central panel states 
(Florida, Minnesota, New Jersey), the director is required to make 
hearing assignments based upon the judges' expertise in the subject 
92. In 1981, the states of California, Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
New Jersey, and Tennessee had some form of central panel in operation. Rich, supra 
note 82, at 249. The proponents of S. 1275 presented only the Minnesota experience. 
Clearly, the efforts to document cost savings is incomplete. 
93. Hearings on S. 127.5, supra note 3, at 27 (statement of Hon. Victor W. Palmer, 
Chairman of the Corps Comm. of the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference). 
94. M. RICH Ik. W. BRUCAR, THE CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW JUDGES: A SURVEY OF SEVEN STATES 50 (1983). 
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matter of the proceeding.9s In other states, each employing agency 
that employs administrative law judges retains assignment discre­
tion.96 No evidence has been proffered that the administrative pro­
cess has been made more, or less, efficient by the use of any of these 
systems. 
Also, no documentation was presented to show the present fed­
eral procedures lead to overstaffing. In fact, there are safeguards to 
protect against the condition. Distribution of judges to agencies is 
controlled by Office of Management and Budget and Congress. The 
federal agencies must justify their requests for judges to those bodies. 
No data has been offered which demonstrate that any agency suffers 
an overstaffing problem. 
Staff surplus normally is caused by inaccurate caseload forecast­
ing. Those prognostications depend upon a variety of factors. Such 
external, uncontrollable, factors as the nation's economic climate, 
stability and growth of certain industries, human and industrial rela­
tions philosophies and practices, national defense posture, research 
and development activities, and fiscal policies have an impact upon 
their conclusions. These elements contribute to making the present 
system subject to error in staffing forecasts. 
Nothing in Senate bill 1275 can eliminate the presence of these 
forces. How centralization of assignment procedures might control 
them is entirely elusive and unexplained. 
Regarding the superior efficiency claimed to exist within Senate 
bill 1275, it is argued that the Corps would reduce present duplica­
tion of support services such as law libraries, case-tracking systems, 
administrative and clerical personnel, office space and travel of­
fices.97 That argument bears little merit. Concededly, there may be 
some amelioration of existing profusion. The attendant "efficien­
cies", however, would be insubstantial and speculative. Currently, 
the agencies to which administrative law judges are assigned main­
tain the enumerated facilities for the benefit of all agency personnel, 
including the judges.98 Senate bill 1275 would do nothing to change 
the agencies' need to provide those services to non-administrative 
law judges. In reality, Senate bill 1275 merely would effect a transfer 
of those functions, as they apply to, and are necessary for, the judges 
to the Corps. As earlier noted, all incumbent judges would be trans­
95. Id 
96. Id 
97. Hearings on S. IllS, supra note 3, at 26 (statement of Hon. Victor W. Palmer). 
98. Id 
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ferred to the Corps under the scheme of Senate bill 1275.99 The 
judges' support requirements will not vanish. In this context, it is 
entirely possible that the transfer of support services would increase, 
rather than reduce, overall operational costs and inefficiency. 
That a new, patently unwieldy, bureaucracy will emanate from 
Senate bill 1275 cannot be ignored. The Corps would initially con­
sist of over 1100 judges, over 800 of whom (in SSA) are stationed in 
approximately 140 locations throughout the country.lOO Addition­
ally, the Corps necessary would have to include law clerks, paralegal 
personnel, together with clerical and administrative staffs. It has 
been estimated that the entire employee complement of the Corps 
would reach 5,000 individuals. lol Management of such numbers of 
personnel, most of whom under present conditions are situated in 
outposts scattered around the nation, poses self-evident conflicts to a 
claim of efficiency. 102 
Finally, Senate bill 1275 inherently is inefficient. I have earlier 
alluded to the manner in which the operating divisions will be or­
ganized. There is an imbalance in administrative law judges com­
plement among the substantive divisions. For example, the Division 
of General Programs and Grants will include judges now serving in 
six agencies (Drug Enforcement Administration, Housing and Ur­
ban Development, Food and Drug Administration, Bureau of Alco­
hol, Tobacco and Firearms, Postal Service and Merit Systems 
Protection Board).103 On October 31, 1982, only ten judges were at­
tached to those agencies, in 1010. 104 In contrast, the Division of La­
bor Relations (National Labor Relations Board and Federal Labor 
Relations Authority) will consist ofjudges from two agencies. lOS On 
99. s. 1275 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 562(b». 
100. Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 3, at 180-81 (statement of Hon. Joseph B. 
Kennedy). 
101. Id 
102. A literal interpretation of S. 1275 demonstrates the magnitude of its inherent 
inefficiency. The Corps is to be located "at the seat of Government"; presumably Wash­
ington, D.C. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Scss. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 562(a». Currently, administrative law judges are stationed in widely dispersed areas of 
the country or are required to travel throughout the nation from bases in the capital. 
Surely, S. 1275 docs not seriously contemplate that each litigant and witness will be re­
quired to appear in Washington to be heard. If not, then the potential efficiencies as­
serted from consolidation arc imagined. 
103. Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 3, at 42-43 (statement of Hon. Victor W. 
Palmer). 
104. Id at 63. 
105. Id at 43. 
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October 31, 1982, there were 123 judges assigned to those agen­
cies; 106 and the Division of Benefits Programs will be formed with 
judges of only one agency (SSA),107 to which 820 judges were as­
signed on October 31, 1982.108 
It has been asserted that a "collegial structure" of management 
is established by the bill. 109 A more precise term is "collision" struc­
ture. As earlier observed, the chief judge of each of the Corps' sub­
stantive divisions will be its managerial body, together with the 
Corps' chief judge. I 10 When perceived needs for professional and 
non-professional staffing, case-handling priorities, and budgetary re­
quirements are evaluated by each of the division chiefs, unavoidable 
conflicts will arise. The Council and chief judge are likely to become 
preoccupied with matters of internal strife, the unravelling of which 
will be dictated by the imbalance of power implied by the sheer nu­
merical comparisons of judges' complement and caseload within the 
competing divisions. 
Currently, each agency is able to establish its own priorities rel­
ative to the performance of its special statutory mandates. Except 
for the problem within SSA, there are no serious challenges from the 
administrative law practitioners or the general public that the agen­
cies are not satisfactorily fulfilling their obligations. Viewed in this 
light, it seems more efficient to leave the present system undisturbed 
than to create an entity with limitless possibilities of fomenting frus­
tration, anxiety and enmity. 
D. Miscellaneous Claims 
It has been urged that independence is questionable because 
employing agencies provide their judges with such things as office 
space, parking facilities and travel assistance. II I Obviously, those 
items are ministerial and administrative in character. It is straining 
to use such arguments as proof there is an impediment to decisional 
freedom. 
Finally, at the June, 1983 Senate hearing, it was suggested that 
the bill "provide[s] new means for assisting our overloaded federal 
106. Id at 63. 
107. Id at 43. 
108. Id at 63. 
109. Id at 41. 
110. S. 1275, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 565(a». 
Ill. Hearings on S. 1175, supra note 3, at 177 (statement of Hon. Joseph B. 
Kennedy). 
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courts. . at their request." I 12 Senate bill 1275 authorizes federal 
courts, as well as agencies, to refer certain types of proceedings to the 
COrpS.11l 
No evidence was produced to show that the federal courts will 
request such assistance. In any event, the possibility that the admin­
istrative law judges might render such assistance is not a persuasive 
reason to establish the Corps. To be potent, an argument should be 
directed to show how the various features of the Corps bills improve 
the administrative process. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The claimed benefits of Senate bill 1275 are only superficially 
appealing. Thoughtful analysis demonstrates their inadequacies. 
Insufficient data has been presented to prove a need for an adminis­
trative law judge corps. The available evidence shows the present 
administrative processes function satisfactorily under the AP A. 
Congress should not enact Senate bill 1275 or House resolution 
3539. Instead, it should take steps to remove the cloud from deci­
sional independence in the only place where it has been shown to be 
present: SSA. Administrative law judge decisional independence 
will be reaffirmed by transfer of SSA judges to a Health and Human 
Services Review Commission. The entire administrative judiciary 
need not be overhauled. 114 
112. Id. at 27 (statement of Hon. Victor W. Palmer). 
113. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c. 
§ 568(a)(3». 
114. On October 5, 1983, Congresswoman Mary Rose Ouar (Chair, House Sub­
committee on Compensation and Employee Benefits. Committee on Post Office and Civil 
Service), joined by Congressman Clarence Long. introduced H.R. 4090, 98th Cong .• 1st 
Sess. (1983). At this writing, the introduction of an identical bill is being considered in 
the Senate. H.R. 4090 would transfer administrative law judge pay authority from the 
Office of Personnel Management to the Commission of Executive. Legislative and Judi­
cial Salaries. Id 
The Ouar bill serves to cure a legislative oversight during enactment of the 1978 
Civil Service Reform Act, ch. 11. Pub. L. No. 95-454. 92 Stat. 1119 (1978) (codified at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1105 (1982». Under the 1978 Act, administrative law judges were ex­
empt from the performance appraisal. pay bonus. and other provisions applicable to se­
nior non-administrative law judge officials. Id § 203(a) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 4301 
(1982». This was proper because work appraisals and monetary influences are inconsis­
tent with decisional independence. H.R. 4090 removes administrative law judges from 
the pay schedules which apply generally to federal career employees. H.R. 4090. 98th 
Cong.• 1st Sess. (1983). This bill should be passed in conjunction with the HHS Review 
Commission. Its enactment will complement the administrative law judge exclusion 
from the Civil Service Reform Act and will signal further cognition of the judicial char­
acter and unique status Congress has historically accorded to administrative law judges. 
H.R. 4090 is supponed by the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference without 
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apparent controversy. Favorable action on that bill will reconfirm congressional intent 
to foster independence for administrative law judges. 
